

June 16

The alarm clock Esti bought just for this single ring, rang at five o'clock in the morning. Esti is leaving. The Taxi is picking her up at five thirty. I opened my eyes, and in the dim morning light I realized that the population of the room had doubled during the night: The two beautiful furry cats that belonged to the guesthouse have chosen my room to spend the night. Esti said with a smile: "I guess you won't be **completely** alone after all. They probably sensed you love cats." It was a comforting thought, for some reason. Also, my gum was much better. Yesterday evening I had the manager of *De Fortuna* call the local dentist, and made an appointment for eight thirty this morning. Should I cancel? I kissed Esti good-bye, and dosed back into what was left of this night's sleep.

At eight the new alarm clock hit again. Esti must have set it before leaving. I woke, immediately conscious to the state of my gum. Should I cancel? This business with the dentist is really out of place. Had it happened when Esti was still here, I would not have minded a visit to the dentist, with her. But alone.. Even yesterday, when I was really aching, I was reluctant to ask for a dentist. I'd **much** prefer the infection to pass without professional intervention. What eventually compelled me to get up during dinner and talk to the manager about a dentist, was *Heidegger*²⁵. As he had taught me, I **cared** about my situation, and did what the rules prevailing in my *worldview* prescribe in such cases: I got up and asked the manager for a dentist. Simultaneously, I also applied a second rule; the rule against *haste* (which is a variation of the rule against *fanaticism*), and added that I don't insist on an immediate appointment; If it is inconvenient, tomorrow morning will do. Thus, I ended up with an eight thirty appointment with Dr. Schaap (*Sheep* in Dutch).

It's eight o'clock. Should I cancel? I am definitely much better. Maybe the gum problem was just a physical manifestation of my fear of being left alone. I have never been alone for two and a half weeks. In fact, I have never been alone for two and a half **days** (I am not kidding!). Or maybe my faithful exercise of *care* about my health has already born fruit, and **making** the appointment already solved half the problem? Well, even if I decide to cancel, I need to tell the manager. So I went to the reception, and shared my doubts with Mr. Dekker, the manager. I could have guessed his reaction: "Go to the dentist. If you don't, you are bound to hurt again tonight". He must have read Heidegger. He was right, of course. What excuse did I have for **not** going? Just an instinctive and unjustified aversion from doctors in general and dentists in particular.

So I went, thinking about Heidegger. I entered a large waiting room, that served several doctors' clinics. One of the doors said *Huisarts*, another *Tandarts*. I bet on the latter, (it

²⁵ Heidegger⁵² contributed two important concepts to my *worldview*: The concept of *Dasein*, the subjective awareness of 'I', which will be discussed later, and the concept of *Sorge*, or **care**. He maintained, that an important characteristic of being a **subject**, (the *Dasein*), is the intentional nature, which he understood as **caring**. I, as a (human) **subject**, *care* about things. Heidegger offers an original angle to describe the **moral** nature of rational creatures. Instead of saying that they have the capacity to distinguish between good and bad, he says they have the capacity to **care** (about what happens). **Care** is the opposite of **indifference**.

wasn't much of a bet, because I spotted another sign, saying *Dr. Schaap*), and joined several other patients waiting by it. Every few minutes a hidden speaker mumbled a name, and one of the waiting patients would rise and enter the inner office. I felt the urge to enter unannounced, to make sure I am on some list. But it was exactly eight thirty, so I decided to wait. Fifteen minutes (and two patients) later, I contemplated on leaving. My gum felt just fine, and I didn't feel like entering the clinic and complaining. Heidegger's grip on my decisions must have faded, because it was *Kant* who sent me in to tell the doctor I exist (outside in the waiting room). Apparently, I wasn't on the list, because Mr. Dekker called Dr. Schaap at **home** last night. I could have waited outside forever. I was immediately accepted, and treated by Dr. Schaap's associate, a friendly young woman called Dr. Verhoef.

Why **Kant**²⁶? Because Kant's deontological ethics supply an extremely **simple** method for leading a **good** life: Abide by the rules of **your** world. **If** in **your** world gum aches result from gum infection, and dentists cure gum infections, then the general rule applicable in case of gum aches is "see the dentists!". If it was not **me** sitting in the waiting room, but someone else, I would **definitely** have advised him to see the dentist, even if it means barging into the inner office, and even if the gum seemed to be getting better. So this was the advice I gave to myself, and found myself in Ann-Mary Verhoef's chair. She gave me two shots and treated me for twenty minutes. I had a bad infection.

I returned to *De Fortuna*, childishly proud of myself. I decided not to have breakfast, and drank two cups of thick Dutch coffee. I was sitting near the reception desk of the guesthouse, observing Mr. Dekker receive a phone call. He seemed to get excited, mumbled a few Dutch words, hung up and hurried out, grasping his coat. I wondered what happened. I looked out the glass window and saw Mr. Dekker start his car and drive away. I remained seated for another ten minutes, and as I was getting up to go to my room, I saw Mr. Dekker parking his car. Next to him sat an elderly oriental looking lady, laughing at something Mr. Dekker was saying to her in English. Mr. Dekker ran out of his car, opened the trunk and retrieved two identical suitcases. As I was walking to my room, I got a good look at the lady, who was entering the guest house with Mr. Dekker. She was Japanese, probably in her sixties, with a pair of light blue eyes and smooth, white skin. She was very beautiful, despite her age.

I am now sitting here, just finished telling you this morning's events, thinking of my thesis. How to start? I need to go below the line, and get organized there. I've been

²⁶ Kant is all over the place: He was a revolutionary **epistemologist**, contributed to Logic, Aesthetics, and metaphysics. But it is Kant's **ethics** that, to me, make him the most important thinker in the history of modern philosophy. Kant's epistemological Copernican revolution does not come close to the revolution in his original conception of **deontological** ethics.⁵³ Here is how I understand his position: *Worldviews* are governed by *rules*. These *rules* are constituted by no other than the particular **holder** of the particular *worldview*. *Rules* have the odd nature of being **breakable**: It is **possible** not to abide by the *rule*, but to break it (see footnote 18 above). When a rule is accepted (or, rather, **constituted**, which is in this context synonymous) by someone, and also **broken** by him, a **contradiction** occurs (is manifested): The *worldview* is incoherent: Its holder does not abide by the rules of his own system.

writing scattered thoughts, dropping names of philosophers here and there - don't even bother going there, unless you must. Nothing important happened. Maybe I should read the last few footnotes, see if I could pick up on anything there.²⁷ I managed to squeeze out a half decent footnote, so I can reward myself with a small lunch, as I've skipped breakfast.

Returned from lunch. It seems I will not have a chance to be lonely after all; Mr. Dekker noticed me on the way out and invited me to join him and his new oriental guest to lunch. I was strongly attracted to her quiet, impressive appearance, and gladly accepted. Mr. Dekker introduced her by her first name only. He said: "Please meet **Gaya**. She has been a regular guest here since before I was born". Gaya did not seem nearly old enough to satisfy this statement, but I said nothing, assuming it was just a figure of speech to stress how faithful a guest she was. I asked politely: "How long will you be staying?" and she spoke for the first time. She smiled and said: "It depends." Dekker interrupted: "She never tells me how long she plans to stay. I suspect she is just trying to make my life miserable". Gaya smiled again and said: "You know better than that. I promise to tell you as soon as I know." Dekker sighed: "I know, I know. Do you mind if I leave you two alone for a while? I have a lot to do." I didn't mind. Gaya and her smile intrigued me. I asked her: "Was he serious in saying you have been coming here since before he was born?" "Sure" said Gaya. Her English was much better than mine. "This place stands here since 1654." "I know," said I. "But Mr. Dekker does not seem **nearly** young enough for

²⁷ We shall return to Kant and Heidegger later. Let me now elaborate a little on my proposed new temporal semantic interpretation to propositional calculus. My **domain** consists of objects of one kind: of **properties**. Every propositional variable (such as P,Q etc.) in (the syntax of) propositional calculus refers to a corresponding **property** in the domain. This interpretation is based on *Alonzo Church's*⁵⁴ **P₁** language. Every simple well-formed-formula (*wff*) in **P₁**, i.e. an **implication** (P \supset Q), constitutes a claim regarding a relation ("entailment") which prevails (or does not prevail) between two properties. A domain must contain **at least** two properties, hereafter denoted by the propositional constants **F** and **E**. The relations prevailing between these two properties are: F entails E, E does not entail F. The relation of entailment is not reflexive, and it is transitive (if F entails E and E entails G, then F entails G). The properties in the domain may each be in one of two states: "on" or "off". The truth value of each propositional variable corresponds to the state of the corresponding property at any given point in time. The domain is dynamic (changes over time) in two ways: The properties in it change their state (from "on" to "off" and back), and new properties are born, according to a mechanism to be described later.

Some *wffs* in **P₁**, are contradictions (e.g. P \supset \sim P). All *wffs* that are **contradictions**, refer to property F. Some *wffs* in **P₁**, are theorems (e.g. P \supset P). All *wffs* that are theorems, refer to property E. The *wff* (P \supset P) \supset F is (syntactically) a **contradiction**, and therefore refers to 'F'. Out of the infinity of *wffs* in **P₁**, some are **contradictions**, therefore refer to F, some are **theorems**, referring to E, and some are neither theorems nor contradictions; e.g., P \supset Q. These *wffs* are **contingent**. Contingent *wffs* refer to the relation between its two corresponding properties. Propositional variables correspond to a property. The truth value of the propositional variable corresponds to the state of the property.

Now, let us get an intuitive feel for this newly constructed domain. It contains a multitude of **properties**, two of which we already know: F and E. Whenever a **contradiction** appears in language, we recognize it as such, and this encounter teaches us something new. Say at a given moment, property P is on and Q is off, and the *wff* P \supset Q is encountered. The logical mechanism then settles the contradiction by creating a new property, R, which is the property of being P but not Q.

this to be true". I figured a sophisticated, implied compliment would not hurt an old lady. Gaya smiled again. "It is not Dekker's youth, but my old age, that makes it true. I am an old friend of the family. I was very close to his mother and grandmother." I was **dying** to ask Gaya how old she was. Her smooth oriental face provided no clue. Neither did her hands, which were as smooth and white as her face. She said: "I understand you came here to write?" I was flabbergasted. "Yes. When did Dekker have the chance to tell you this?" She smiled for the third time: "I saw you before, when I came in. I asked Dekker who you were, and he said that you came here to write some book. Are you a writer?" It was **my** turn to be flattered. Why on earth should she ask Dekker about me? But I didn't dare to ask. Instead, I answered: "No. I am trying to write my MA thesis. In philosophy." She seemed interested. "How interesting!" she said. "What about?" I have been asked this question endlessly over the last months, and hated it. I never know how to answer. This time I tried a new approach. "I'm not sure. I hope it will come." Gaya came alive. Her blue eyes (I have never before seen a Japanese person with blue eyes) were shining with interest. She leaned forward and said: "**Really?** How splendid!" Before I had the chance to ask her what was so splendid, the waitress came with our order, and a moment later Dekker rejoined us. The remainder of lunch was uneventful, and before I got up to leave, I said to her: "I hope to have the chance of speaking with you again." "But of course!" said Gaya. "I insist!". I left.

I am back in my room now, reliving this last hour. I don't know what got me so excited. She is an extremely nice old lady, with beautiful eyes and a warm smile, but this is hardly a reason for my strange feeling of infatuation. What **is** it about her I find so appealing? I know: She showed **real** interest. It seemed she **really** cared about who I am and what I do. Hopefully I will meet her again at dinner. If I'm lucky, we might even eat together again. Time to return to my footnotes.²⁸

²⁸ The syntax of P_1 has a single operator: ' \supset ', also known as 'implication'. This operator is a connective, used to create a new *wff* out of two *wffs* which compose it: If P and Q are *wffs*, $P \supset Q$ is also a *wff*. Two properties in the domain may compose a third property: When a speaker of P_1 encounters an implication $P \supset Q$, he understands it as "P entails Q", which means that if P is on, Q **must** be on too. This is **modus ponens**. If P is on and P entails Q, then Q must be on too. If the speaker is faced with the property *bird* being on, and he also holds that '*birds are winged*' ("birdhood entails winghood"), then even if he does not directly recognize winghood, he may deduce from these two *wffs* that '*winged*' is on too.

The best way to grasp the nature of these properties populating the domain of such a language, and the relations of entailment prevailing amongst them, is **not** as **sets** as in set theory, whereas our domains contain no **objects**, no **members** of such sets. The property *red* requires no red **objects** to have meaning, and neither does the property *pegasus*. A property derives its meaning not **extensionally**, as in predicate logic, but **intensionally**: through its entailment relations with other properties. The property *red* derives its meaning from all the other properties which entail *red* (like *tomato*), and from those which *red* entails (like *color*).

Now, consider two speakers, S1 and S2. The **only** thing they have in common, is that they are speakers of the language P_1 . As speakers, who use P_1 to **communicate**, they know (or, rather, they **assume**) each other to be speakers of P_1 . That is, each knows that the other's *wffs* refer to properties in a domain, which necessarily contain F and E. They may have never spoken before, and therefore are not acquainted with each other's *wffs*. Now, S1 utters the expression *Gavagay*⁵⁵. S2 never heard this word before, and contemplates: By saying *Gavagay*, S1 cannot mean the contradiction F. S1 knows that S2 is a speaker, and

I just had a horrible experience. I must be plagued - first my gum and now this. I smoked some grass I bought in Amsterdam on my arrival. I thought it would help me put some sense into the implications, negations and contradictions below the line. Instead, I became nauseous and felt so bad I thought I will die. I drank a bottle of water, took a shower, a walk, but nothing helped. I crumbled on the bed, swearing at my own stupidity. I should know better! And just after I so clearly (?) explained why one should obey his own rules... I begged forgiveness from Kant, lying on my bed with the whole of Edam whirling around me. I could not believe the intensity in which I was receiving signs in this place. Two lessons in one day?! I seemed to have **understood** the gum ache. I admit that it was **good** that I had it - It taught me a lesson, and no harm was effected. Need I now **understand** this horrible feeling in order for it to pass? I swore never to let it happen again, dragged myself to the bathroom and returned the lunch I so enjoyed having with Gaya. Relieved, I returned to bed and carefully paid attention to my quick recovery.

After playing with *Gavagay* in the footnotes, I went for dinner. I must have done **something** right today, because Gaya was sitting alone at a table for two, and offered me to join her. She said: "I asked Dekker whether you have already eaten, and he said you have not. So I took the liberty of saving you a seat. I understand that you are alone, like me. Would you?" I was delighted, and made no effort to hide it. I was genuinely intrigued by this lady. I sat down across the table from her, and said: "This is **awfully** nice of you. I am really flattered." "Flattered?" She asked. "Why flattered?" I did not know how to reply, so I said so. "I don't know. That is how I feel." Gaya seemed pleased. "You keep giving the right answers" she said. "Are there **wrong** answers?" I questioned. I was starting to regain my self confidence. "By 'right' answers I mean answers that **I** like. Yes, there **are** answers which I dislike. These, for me, are wrong."

After having ordered, Gaya asked me: "Are you the western man?" I was not sure I understood her question. "**The** western man?" I accented the first word. "Are you not familiar with this expression?" She wondered. "I Think I am" I replied. "Did you mean to ask me whether I was **a** western man?" She smiled, as if she knew something I did not. "What is the difference?" "The difference between **a** western man and **the** western man?" "Yes." Said Gaya: "I often fail to see **the** difference between using the indefinite article and the definite article." "I see" said I: "You remind me of my masseuse, Michael. He is a new immigrant from Russia, and he does not understand the **definite** article; In Russian

pointing to F which is apriori known to both, would serve absolutely no purpose. S1's uttering a **contradiction** alone does not constitute **communication**, a conversation (unless they are *Zen-Buddhists*, to which I shall refer later). So, S2 assumes *Gavagay* refers to another property in S1's domain. S2 does not (yet) know anything about this property, but his repertoire of properties has increased by one: The new property *Gavagay* was added to it. S2's reasoning can thus be phrased as $S1 \supset Gavagay$. (If the property S1 is on, then *Gavagay* is on too. Or more loosely phrased, *Gavagay* belongs to S1). Next, S2 wishes to learn more about the newly acquired property *Gavagay*. He exchanges *wffs* with S1 to find out more about *Gavagay* and more of S1's *wffs*. This process was termed by Quine **radical translation**⁵⁶.

there is no such distinction. He always says ‘If cold I close window’²⁹ or ‘How is pain?’”. Gaya asked: “Do you speak Russian?” “Not a word” I replied. “I do. I always thought that in Russian, **Every** noun **automatically** carries the definite article. By asking you ‘How is pain?’, I believe your masseuse **meant** to ask you ‘How is **the** pain, did he not? He **must** have meant **your** pain!” This was news to me: “You mean that by saying ‘Coffee is hot’ Michael actually, **always**, means ‘**the** coffee is hot?’” “Precisely!” said Gaya. “How, then, would a Russian say ‘coffee contains caffeine?’” She answered: “He would **say** ‘coffee contains caffeine’, because there is no definite article in Russian, but he would **mean** ‘**the** coffee contains **the** caffeine’, of course. Do you find any difference in **meaning** between the two? Would you understand him **differently** if he said so, or, for that matter, ‘**the** coffee contains caffeine’, or ‘coffee contains **the** caffeine?’” I paused for thought, pretending to be busy chewing **the** first course of **the** meal that was just served. I was trying to think of an example where the evident difference between the definite and indefinite was indispensable. Finally I spoke: “You mean that the distinction is redundant? How about the need to distinguish between **this** coffee and coffee in general? for example, ‘**this** coffee is good coffee?’” Gaya had no problem with my counter example: “Michael would probably say ‘Coffee is good’, and nothing would be lost in the translation. Look, don’t try to find counter examples. The Russians have survived for a

²⁹ **Conditionals:** A conditional proposition of the form $A \supset B$ is the basic unit of **communication** between speakers; the basic **sentence**. When speaker S1 says to S2: ‘ $A \supset B$ ’, he directs the attention of S2 to the property denoted by **B**, using A as a ‘pointer’: S1 assumes that A is already known (or, rather, **identified**) by S2, and **based** on the presupposed (shared) acquaintance with A, he ‘asks’ S2 to posit an additional property, one that is entailed by A (hence is its necessary consequent). The implication acts as a ‘link’ between properties, enabling speakers to direct their fellow speakers through **chains** of properties, each property entailed (implied) by its predecessor. When S2 recognizes something S1 uttered (verbally or otherwise) as a sentence (as an **implication**), he takes it as a ‘request’ to focus his attention on some property hereafter denoted by B.

This explains the great significance of the contradiction in communication; It is not something obscure, inexplicable, meaningless (whereas everything follows from it). On the contrary: It is the clearest, most evident, the **only** term in language that **everybody** understands (has a specific corresponding property which is denoted by it). That is how *Zen* priests stay in touch with each other, although they are in completely separate worlds: They realize that the only thing they have in common is F (and the syntax of P_1), and they constantly say to each other: “contradiction!”, “contradiction!” and know (for sure) that they are properly **understood**.

A *wff* which is an implication of the form $A \supset B$ denotes the relation prevailing between A and B. This is how speakers help each other create new properties. Supposing S1 and S2 each have a property, P, each assuming that his fellow speaker means ‘the same’ property (whatever ‘same’ means) by P. Let us further assume that S1 has a second property, Q, which he wants S2 to share with him (to have a ‘similar’ Q in his system). In order to achieve this, S1 needs a ‘hinge’, a sort of ‘hook’ on which to ‘hang’ Q, which is new to S2. He needs to ‘define’ Q for S2. For this he needs P: a property that entails Q, and known to S2. (1) If he can find no such P, such as the case of two speakers who know **nothing** of each other, except for the fact that they are speakers, (a situation of *radical translation*), then he must start with F, which he **knows** his fellow speaker to possess; In this case he simply ‘asks’ him to create (their first shared) concept (property). (E.g., *Gavagay*). But in case (2) they already have some property they considered shared (e.g. P), then S1 can communicate a property Q that is **new** for S2, by saying $P \supset Q$. S2 then creates a new property that includes the property (denoted by) P, which he thereafter refers to as Q.

long time without the distinction. If the distinction was indispensable, their language would have provided for it. Everything that can be said in English could also be articulated in Russian. Different languages have different ways of expression. Before dinner I was leafing through the bible I found in my room. There exists a Hebrew preposition that has no English translation; The fourth word in the book of Genesis?" "Yes - the word תּוֹכַח" I replied, and added: "The man who declared the independence of the state of Israel and was its first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, maintained that this word was redundant, and made a point of never using it!" "How interesting!" Said Gaya. "I wonder why he picked this poor little preposition. I would have started with eliminating the distinction between the definite and indefinite".³⁰

I watched Gaya finish the first course. She seemed older than this morning, but even more beautiful. Her silky white hair was woven into a neat plait that was hanging loosely on her shoulder. After the waitress cleared the table for the main course, I asked: "So what

³⁰ **The** definite article is an unessential, although a convenient convention in many languages. It signals, that the noun in question is **particular**. This particularity has nothing to do with material existence, nor with uniqueness. It just signals that the noun following it **should** be familiar to the hearer of the expression containing it. Let us assume, that S1 and S2 **share** their understanding of the term *the*, and let us further assume that S1 uttered *the Gavagay*. Would S2 now be in a better position to understand S1's utterance? It seems not. The definite article is useful **only** for past reference; When it is used, as in *the Gavagay*, the hearer should understand that the speaker means **the same Gavagay** that was mentioned (or implied) **before**. For the definite article to be effectively used, a **shared context** is already assumed. The nouns in this shared context are entitled with the article, to identify them as such.

But before our two speakers could establish an agreed term to specify properties that are already **shared**, that belong to some **shared context**, such a shared context needs first to be established. The first name that enters this shared, **objective** domain, is of course *Gavagay*. Within S2's domain of properties, S2 creates a "sub directory" of properties that he takes S1 to **share** with him. Next, S1 utters a second name: *Managay*. (This exercise is conducted from S2's point of view, and demonstrates the evolution in S2's conceptual scheme. It is assumed, that S1 undergoes a similar process, which I will disregard). *Managay* is added as a second property to the special sub-domain S2 created in his scheme, devoted to properties which they both share. S2 may thus accumulate a multitude of shared, "objective" properties, and gradually discovers the entailment relations prevailing between the newly acquired "objective" (shared) properties. The objective domain, **shared** by both speakers, is developing, becoming **richer** not only with (names of) properties, but also with relations prevailing between them.

Let us now somewhat revise the circumstances of the conversation between S1 and S2. This time, let us add **another** *apriori* property that is shared by both; that is **objective**. Let us call this property **existence**, or in shorthand, *x*. This time, the speakers not only assume each other to be **speakers**, namely, to master the syntax of P_1 (and its **innate** property, *F*), but also to (both) have the *apriori* property *x*; the way they (both) understand this property is as follows: It is the property of **all** the properties belonging to the shared, objective sub-domain ("all the properties that exists in the shared world": - "objective properties"). (When I say "property *p* has a property *q*", I simply mean "*p* entails *q*", or $p \supset q$). Every property that belongs to the objective sub-domain, entails *x*. In any particular domain ("scheme"), some properties entail *x* (they belong to the objective sub-domain; they "exist"), and some do not (they "don't exist" – they don't belong to the objective sub-domain). This special property *x* lets us make existential claims in propositional calculus: To express: "For every *x*, Px " we say: $x \supset P$ ("existence entails P-hood"); and to express "There exists *x* so that Px " we say: " $\sim (P \supset \sim x)$ " "P-hood does not entail inexistence".

did **you** mean by asking me whether I was **the** western man?" "I was asking a question **about** you. I was asking whether the description 'the western man' applies to you." I did not know what the right answer to this question was. Gaya was Japanese, definitely **not** "the" western man. But how could I possibly deny it of myself? "I'm afraid I am", I finally answered. "**Afraid**? That is strange!" She seemed surprised. "Is being the western man not considered a compliment by the western men?" I decided to take the initiative. "Or the western **woman**?" Gaya was surprised again. "The western woman? I have never heard this expression, except in the context of the American wild west. Is there such a thing as 'the western woman'?" "I don't know. I thought you could tell me." I replied. "Well, I don't think so. I think that the western man has made a point of his being the western **man**, not western **person**." I thought I understood. "Do I sense some gender-based criticism?" "I make it a point never to **criticize**" said Gaya. "But I must admit, that I do resent the age-long discrimination against women in the history of western civilization." "Only **western** civilization?" I wondered. "I understand that women were not better off in any **eastern** civilization!" Gaya became more serious. "Well, maybe. But in eastern civilization, women were usually considered something **very** different from men. In the east, they could hardly be **compared**."

After the main course, Dekker joined us for coffee, and the conversation concentrated on "what's new in Edam". I learned about a local music festival a week from today, and that Gaya planned on staying at least until then. Dekker was pleased to receive **some** information about her plans - he was obsessed with not getting stuck with empty rooms. Before returning to my room, I gathered some courage, and offered Gaya to join me on tomorrow's morning walk after breakfast. She accepted, provided it would not rain. I went to sleep wondering whether Gaya didn't have anything better to do than spend time with me.