June 20

After two hours of predicate logic[42] before breakfast, I met Gaya in the dining room. "Come, I want to show you something" she said as we started our morning walk. She led

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[42] Let me now return to the discussion of **predicate calculus**, last discussed in footnote 31. There I maintained, that predicate logic may be constructed **out of** (which is another way of saying it is **reducible to**) propositional calculus. Here, again, is the proposed transformation:

$$Pa \Rightarrow a{\supset}P$$
$$(x)Px \Rightarrow x{\supset}P$$
$$(\exists x)Px \Rightarrow {\sim}(x{\supset}{\sim}P)$$
$$(x)(Px{\supset}Gx) \Rightarrow x{\supset}(P{\supset}G)$$
$$(x){\sim}(Px{\supset}Gx) \Rightarrow x{\supset}{\sim}(P{\supset}G)$$
$$(\exists x)(Px{\supset}Gx) \Rightarrow {\sim}[x{\supset}{\sim}(P{\supset}G)]$$
$$(\exists x){\sim}(Px{\supset}GX) \Rightarrow {\sim}[x{\supset}(P{\supset}G)]$$
$$(x)(y)Pxy \Rightarrow x{\supset}(y{\supset}P)$$
$$(x){\sim}(y)Pxy \Rightarrow x{\supset}{\sim}(y{\supset}P)$$
$$(\exists x)(y)Pxy \Rightarrow {\sim}[x{\supset}{\sim}(y{\supset}P)]$$
$$(\exists x){\sim}(y)Pxy \Rightarrow {\sim}[x{\supset}(y{\supset}P)]$$
$$(y)(\exists x)Pxy \Rightarrow y{\supset}{\sim}(x{\supset}{\sim}P)$$
$$(y){\sim}(\exists x)Pxy \Rightarrow y{\supset}(x{\supset}{\sim}P)$$

This transformation is **truth preserving**, whereas the four rules of inference of the syntax of predicate calculus are equivalent, under the above transformation, to theorems in P_1 (I am herein using the connective **conjunction &**, to avoid long, incomprehensible *wffs*):

(1) Universal generalization: Inferring $(x{\supset}P)$ from P: **$P{\supset}(x{\supset}P)$**.
(2) Universal Instantiation: Inferring $(a{\supset}P)$ from $(x{\supset}P)$, when a exists $(a{\supset}x)$: **$[(a{\supset}x)\&(x{\supset}P)]{\supset}(a{\supset}P)$**.
(3) Existential generalization: Inferring ${\sim}(x{\supset}{\sim}P)$ from $(a{\supset}P)$, when $(a{\supset}x)$: **$[(a{\supset}x)\&(a{\supset}P)]{\supset}[{\sim}(x{\supset}{\sim}P)]$**.
(4) Existential Instantiation: Inferring B from ${\sim}(x{\supset}{\sim}P)$, provided $(P{\supset}B)$: **$[(P{\supset}B)\&{\sim}(x{\supset}{\sim}P)]{\supset}B$**.

Following, are some examples of valid inferences in predicate calculus, and the corresponding inferences in propositional calculus:

(1) $\underline{(x)Px.} \Rightarrow \underline{x{\supset}P.}$ **(2)** $\underline{{\sim}(\exists x)Px.} \Rightarrow \underline{x{\supset}{\sim}P.}$
$(\exists x)Px \Rightarrow {\sim}(x{\supset}{\sim}P)$ $(x)(Px{\supset}Bx) \Rightarrow (x{\supset}P){\supset}(x{\supset}B)$

(3) $\underline{(\exists x)(y)Pxy \Rightarrow {\sim}[x{\supset}{\sim}(y{\supset}P)]}$
$(y)(\exists x)Pxy \Rightarrow y{\supset}[{\sim}(x{\supset}{\sim}P)]$

(1) Let us take a closer look at $(x)Px$: It is the claim, that the predicate P applies (is true of) every object in the domain. Is this a claim **about P**? Traditionally, this is how it is conceived, whereas the domain is assumed to be "fixed", or "well known". This universal claim is understood as making the claim that **P is** universal: It has a certain logical relation with **every** object (that is) x, in the domain: (every) $x{\supset}P$. But just as the **domain** is here used to **describe** P, so P is used to describe the domain; The two terms here **explain each other**. If one is well acquainted with the domain, but knows less about P, by this *wff* he receives a piece of information about P. But if one is not so acquainted with the domain, but knows P, this *wff* tells him something meaningful about the domain, about (the property) x.

The same applies for the existential quantifier: $(\exists x)Px$ is the claim, that the predicate P applies to **at least one** object in the domain. Again, is this about P? I believe it is more about the domain, about x: It says something **about** x, using P: ${\sim}(x{\supset}{\sim}P)$, or ${\sim}(P{\supset}{\sim}x)$.

the way, alongside the southeast border of Edam. It was a street I didn't walk before, as it seemed to be leading nowhere. We walked in silence. I was thinking about possible topics of conversation, when we passed a small triangular cage, about two meters long, one meter wide, and knee-high. In it was a black and white rabbit. It was eating the grass that grew on the cage's floor. I have seen quite a few similar cages in other streets of Edam. I asked: "What do you think about this?" Gaya looked at the caged rabbit, and said: "Do you want to talk about it?" I smiled; "You sound like a psychiatrist." "I am" she replied. "You **are?**" My question mark must have been very accented; she seemed amused; "What is so hard to believe? Did any of our conversations imply the contrary?" Why was I surprised again? Gaya seemed perfectly equipped to be an excellent psychologist. "Are you a **doctor**?" She replied: "I have a Ph.D. in psychology. Hardly a cause for wonder." I returned to the rabbit; "Yes, I want to try to talk about it. Let me see if I can see things **your** way. This rabbit was born in captivity. Its world does not include physical freedom. It does not miss it, because for it, it does not exist. And regarding **my** attitude to the situation, there is nothing I can do about it. I will only get the rabbit killed if I turn it loose. Therefore, I do **not** feel sorry for the rabbit. There is nothing to feel sorry about."

Gaya listened, with a small content smile on her face. She said: "You have done your homework. Did you **write** about yesterday's ducks?" Bingo. "Yes I did." I thought she was now going to ask me about what I am writing, but she didn't. She stopped walking, and pointed to a small grass yard beside the street. It was a small grave yard. It seemed very old, most of the tombstones were missing. Only about twenty of them were left, scattered around. Suddenly I realized that it was a Jewish grave yard. All the tombstones had Hebrew inscriptions. Some of the graves were over a hundred and fifty years old. Gaya said: "It was restored; It was almost completely destroyed in the war." I pointed at one of the graves; "This one was the head of the Jewish congregation in Edam. He died in 1830. His name was Levy." "What else?" said Gaya. "I thought you'd be interested". "I am" I replied; "The last time I saw a place like this was two years ago, in Poland; wait a minute - it was **exactly** two years ago - almost to the date." Gaya looked interested: "You were in Poland?" We started walking away from the grave yard, resuming our walk on the perimeter of the village. On our left was Edam's first row of houses, and on our right, miles of green pastures with cows and sheep all the way to the horizon. I said: "Two years ago exactly, I went to Poland, to see where my father was born and raised." "Your father was born in Poland? How old was he when the war broke out?" She had a quick mind. "Ten years old" I replied; "He went with me; and so did three of his brothers, and five of

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Post Russellian[81] predicate calculus **requires** that the domain **not** be empty, to avoid paradox's (and, e.g., to justify the fact that $(\exists x)Px$ follows syntactically from $(x)Px$). What is the meaning of this condition? That $x \neq F$; that x is **distinct** from F, the contradiction. But this is not an "imposed" arbitrary condition: It is the **way** x (the domain, or, more precisely, the **objective subdomain**) was constructed! Our two long-forgotten S1 and S2 **started** their adventure by **positing** a property that was **defined** as distinct from F: **~(x⊃F)!**

(2) This is one of the odd, sometimes disputed consequences of predicate logic: That $(x)(Px \supset Bx)$ follows from $\sim(\exists x)Px$. If $x \supset \sim P$, then $x \supset P$ is a **contradiction**. Small wonder it is, that it implies $x \supset B$. **F entails everything**.

my cousins." "Quite a delegation" said Gaya; "Did you find it interesting?" "Extremely interesting. And it seems more and more so as time goes by. We traced all the places they lived or stayed in; not only before the war, but also during it". We sat down on a bench that was facing outside of town, into the huge green meadow. Gaya was very interested in my story: "It must have been an overwhelming experience for **him**" she said. "It was" I replied; "I think he is still digesting it. And so am I". "Did he lose many relatives in the holocaust?" I was only half surprised that she used this term. "His father, and one sister out of a total of nine sisters and brothers". "Lucky guy, if you excuse my saying so." I agreed; "Yes, he says so himself". "Was his family orthodox?" "As orthodox as they come" I replied. "He lost this orthodoxy during the war; the **holocaust**, as you call it". "Was I wrong in using the term?" "No, no. It's just that it has become a word reserved for memorial ceremonies and documentary films. It's a **loaded** word". "I know what you mean" said Gaya, and continued the interrogation: "He stopped believing in God?" Good question. "I don't think so. I think he believes in God, although a different one from the God he knew as a child. But I know others that completely lost all faith".

°(**3**) Let us turn to binary predicates (n-ary predicates are than a straightforward generalization). The transformation from predicate to propositional calculus maintains that $(x)(y)Pxy \Rightarrow x \supset (y \supset P)$ [or $y \supset (x \supset P)$]. Here the **objects** under discussion are **pairs**; **ordered** pairs, $<x,y>$. These pairs are also properties, and when a member in the subdomain, they are, as always, **objects**. An example is in order: Let P be the relation *"being the father of.."*, so Pab is the proposition "a is the father of b". a and b **together** are the **object** $<a,b>$. (Naturally, in this example, the domain consists of persons only). The traditional meaning of $(\exists x)(y)Pxy$ is "There exists an object, that is the father of every **object**". But it could just as well be understood as discussing **pairs**, not individuals: Every pair, **could** have (imply) (at least) the three following properties: (1) Its first term could (or not) be an object; (2) its second term could (or not) be an object; and (3) the first term could (or not) be the father of the second. Let us designate this three different properties with x, y, and P, respectively. Now everything is set for the transformation; First, in **English**: $(\exists x)(y)Pxy$ means, that there exists an object who is everybody's father; which is equivalent to saying that it is **false** that for every first term, there exists a second term that is not his son. In other words, that it is **not** the case, that **x**'s **being an object** implies that **P doesn't include y.** The transformation of this *wff* to P_1 expresses this precisely: $\sim[x \supset \sim(y \supset P)]$.

A similar exercise can be performed with $(y)(\exists x)Pxy$: "Everybody has a father". Or, the second term being an **object**, implies that there **exists** a first term while P is satisfied (implies that x does **not** imply $\sim$P). Again, this is precisely $y \supset [\sim x \supset \sim P)]$.

In the standard model of predicate logic, three cases may be distinguished: (**1**) There is nothing **outside** the domain. In this case, the whole of predicate calculus is redundant: Every existential claim would have been true, whereas **everything** is **inside**. This is hardly surprising, in view of what I said several footnotes ago: That predicate logic was devised specifically to handle things which do **not** exist (predicates). (**2**) There is nothing **inside** the domain. This case was ruled out by Russell, for good reasons: It also makes predicate calculus trivial, and turns all predicates into tautologies. The **existence** of an objective subdomain (to define 'existence') must be presupposed. (A bit circular, is it not?). Language requires (the presupposition) of something it discusses. (**3**) There **are** things both **inside** and **outside** of the domain. This is the general, non-trivial case that predicate calculus was designed to handle. In this case, (x)Px does not make P a tautology, although it is true for every **object**. (x)Px is **informative**, whereas it makes a claim regarding the relation that prevails between two properties: P and x.

But is x **itself** an **object** or a **predicate**? I believe it is an object: "The whole (objective) world".

We were sitting and enjoying the beautiful, peaceful scenery. I said: "I think the best way to **describe** the holocaust is to say that it is the exact opposite of **this**." I made the familiar wide gesture, indicating 'everything around us'. "Then, it has a **place** in the world" said Gaya. "Well, if you say that **evil** is a necessary condition for the **good**, then it does" I replied, and added: "At least it served one purpose: It is an eternal exemplification of human evil; A lesson for humankind". "That it is" agreed Gaya; "It is an interesting exercise, although not quite legitimate in certain circles, to ask: 'Would it have been better if the holocaust did not occur?'" "Would **what** have been better?" I asked. "I said the question is hardly legitimate" she said; "How old did you say your father was in 1939?" "He was ten" I replied. "So let me rephrase my question: Put yourself in your father's shoes, as a ten year old boy. And imagine that some prophet, or angel, or something of the sort, sits with you and explains to you the course of history from 1939 to, say, 2000. Then, he gives you the choice to **change** the course of history; for example, have Hitler killed in an accident before he invaded Poland. What would your decision be?" I took a deep breath, and gave it a try: "Let me see. The first thing that comes into my mind, is that **I**, the **me** of today, would not have existed if history were different. My mother came from Germany, from a totally different background from my father's. There is no chance in the world they would meet, if it were not for the war. **I** would have been someone **else**". "Self centered as usual" said Gaya with a smile; "The whole state of Israel would probably not have come into existence. The concept of 'Israeli' would not have existed. The world would have been a different place than it is today". Now I had her by the throat: "Isn't that exactly what I said? **I** would have been someone else!" For the first time since I met her, Gaya seemed lost for words. My education seemed to be progressing. She said carefully: "Yes. So from **your** point of view, the one you are holding **right now**, the holocaust seems a very important event; Not only did you, personally, not suffer from it, it gave you your **life!**" My Jewish instincts were screaming with protest: "In Israel they would have stoned you for these words!" She nodded in agreement: "I know, and rightly so. But don't get me wrong. Remember yesterday's evil duck? I did not deny that it was evil. Were I there by myself with the bread, I would have done what you did: Taken the side of the underling. But you, today, are in the position I was in, yesterday: There is no **reason** to feel sorry for the victims of the holocaust. You cannot do anything for them".

I said nothing. After a while she continued: "Let me try a different angle: Suppose an earthquake, or a terrible plague broke out in Europe in 1939. A natural disaster, that killed twenty five million people, including six million Jews. Would you feel as strongly about it as you do now?" I didn't hesitate; "No. The significance of the holocaust is not the **death** of so many people; not even their **suffering**. It is the fact that it was inflicted by human beings". "And if they were not human beings, but **Martians**?" I could vaguely see

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There are two ways by which a function Px may be turned into a proposition: Either by assigning an individual constant in place of the variable, i.e. Pa (in which case it may be transformed to a⊃P), **or** by quantification: (x)Px. If the quantification is viewed (as suggested here) merely as an implication involving the "existence predicate" x, it is, again, a case of assignment of a constant instead of the variable; Only this time, the constant is not the object a, but the object x: x⊃P.

where she was leading. I replied: "I don't know; I've never met a Martian. Look: I consider myself a member of a **group**, a species: **Humans**. When a group of my **fellow** humans performs acts like the holocaust, I consider it a paradigm of **evil**. More than anything, evil is a question of **intention.** In a manner of speaking, the Nazis betrayed the human race".° Gaya continued my sentence: "And in this betrayal, they provided a paradigmatic example of how humans **should never** behave. Do you believe something like the holocaust may happen again?" "Not as long as the previous holocaust is not forgotten. This is why the Jews are so sensitive to attempts to deny it, or portray it as a mere unfortunate grand mistake". Gaya resumed her teaching position: "You are mixing the **importance**, or **significance** of the event with its **value**. No doubt you realize by now that **value** depends on point of view". "So does **importance**, or **significance**!" said I. "Naturally; But they are still distinct. From your father's point of view, when he was ten, it was both bad **and** important. But from **your** point of view, that of today, it is **important**, not bad. Do not forget: It gave you **your** life, the life you have and know today". Before I had a chance to phrase an answer, she continued: "Did you ever ask your father what he thinks his life would have been like if it were not for the holocaust?" "No, not in so many words. But I can probably portray it for you, after having seen where his family lived and what their lives were like. And I heard many stories". "Please try" she asked. "They would have stayed in *Chelm*, leading a very orthodox way of life, ten kids per family. When we were there, we entered the very apartment they grew up in. It hardly changed. It was under soviet influence until very recently. Believe me, nothing to write home about". "So the people that live in the same apartment today are a good example of what your father's life might have been, if it weren't for the holocaust?" "I guess" I said suspiciously. Gaya moved in for the kill: "Then, your father was in a position to **compare**: He probably leads a happy, modern life, judging from what you turned out to be, and the Polish people that lived in his old apartment supplied an excellent example of what **his** life would have been like, had he not fled Europe. Do you think he would rather have it the other way around?" Good point. What would he say to that? Probably express the wish to have the cake and eat it too: **Not** to have experienced the holocaust, but still go to Palestine, help put up a Jewish state, etc. etc. The main thing my father lost was his **childhood**, his youth. But in return, he received a brand new, extremely different life than he started. Is that a fair exchange? I shared this thought with Gaya. She couldn't agree more: "Precisely. It is a **rule of nature**: The worst, most horrifying predicaments **always** breed magnificent **changes**. The trick in life, **one** of the tricks in life, is to understand these connections. The Nazis were **bad**. As bad as bad can be. But they are dead by now, and the remainder of Nazis in the world are **so much weaker** due to the acts of their

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° In his *introduction to the study of logic*[40] (p. 185) Bergman says: *"The conspicuous thing in the interpretation of **existence** by the universal quantifier in mathematical logic, is that this existence is **closely linked** to the predicate"*. I.e., that (∃x)Px claims the existence of **something that is P.** I prefer to view the situation in reverse: P participates in the **definition** of "existence". It is the **world** that we constantly describe, (or perhaps even **create**) using (our own, **known**) predicates. Mathematical logic automatically presupposes the **domain** to (logically) precede the **proposition**. Based on some apriori domain, we learn something about P by (∃x)Px. I believe it makes much more sense to reverse this order: Every (true) proposition gives us more information about what is **really** interesting: about the world. There is no sense to describe predicates; Predicates were invented to describe reality.

predecessors! Everything, when overdone, is self-refuting. Radical Nazism was the best, the **only**, cure for Nazism. Looking **back**, the holocaust may, and **should**, be viewed as **important**, not just bad. Its importance alone already loads it with value. The suffering paid off: You are here!"

It was a nice morning. Not as sunny and hot as yesterday, but very nice. We were sitting on the bench for a long time. I was getting ready to get up, when Gaya added a final remark: "And, incidentally, the reverse is just as true: Excessive **good** also breeds change; and for the **worse**". "How do you mean?" I inquired. "Did you ever shoot heroin?" "Never went quite as far" I replied. "Well, any hard drug would do for the example. Drugs are paradigmatic in the **suffering** that emerges from extreme enjoyment." I could nothing but agree: It is **excess** that is bad. We got up and resumed our walk. I wondered what my father will say when he hears (or reads) the details of this conversation. We remained on the perimeter of the village, the green fields stretching on our right hand side. We had several short conversations with joggers and walkers that passed us, coming from the opposite directions: 'Have a nice day'; 'Have a nice day' (a friendly smile and a nod, sometimes accompanied by a mumble). Suddenly I saw the ugly dog again. Well, it wasn't **really** ugly; Not **nearly** as ugly as when I saw it last (and first). It was playing with the tennis ball again: Fetching and running, fetching and running. I felt as if I knew it well enough to permit myself to pat it. I approached the dog, but it preferred Gaya's pat. It ran up to her, wagging its tail. I told her about my first encounter with this dog, and the transformation it had undergone in my mind. Gaya burst out laughing: "**Ugly**? This dog is **ugly?** This is as **false**[43] as a statement can be! This is one of

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[43] A statement is **false** if and only if I refuse to accept it as a belief. Iff a proposition is **True**, it is a **belief**. Its **meaning** is determined by other beliefs in the system, the ones that **imply** it (its species) and the ones that **are implied** by it (its genus's). How, than, is it possible to **understand** a false proposition P, in view of the fact that it refers to F; that it **is** a contradiction?

To understand the meaning of a false proposition P is to construct a **context**, a sort of "tentative" sub-system, where P **is** true, thus has meaning. This temporary subsystem, constructed (perhaps) solely for the purpose of understanding P, differs from the "regular" one in some relevant respects. Statements can only be understood "as true". If I am **unable** to construct a context in which P **can** be true, there is no hope for my understanding P. This maneuver enables an infinity of alternate "understandings" of the false proposition: "Snow is black" can, for instance, be interpreted as "snow is necessarily black", or "snow is sometimes black", or "snow is cold" (in case 'black' is synonymous with 'cold') etc. Under the first interpretation, the tentative, temporary subsystem includes a property 'black' that is implied by 'snow'; The second interpretation is based on a subsystem in which 'black' has no relations of implication (inclusion) with 'snow', and the third, of a subsystem in which 'cold' and 'black' are synonyms (equivalent, mutually including). Trying to understand a proposition "while" it is false, is futile.

The fact that I believe "snow is white" and (therefore) consider it **true**, does **not** mean that it is **necessarily** true. I can conceive an alternate belief system that rejects it, and accepts its negation as true. Only *wffs* with the contradiction as the antecedent are **necessarily** true, and **cannot** be false. There is no conceivable alternate system in which the proposition "snow is not snow" can be believed (or "If snow is white then snow is white" considered false): $S \supset \sim S$ is true iff S is a contradiction. Therefore, the proposition "Snow is not snow" can never be **understood** (except as F).

the most beautiful breeds of dogs that ever existed!" She said something to the dog's owner and they both laughed. I was annoyed; "What did you tell him?" "I told him you said his dog was ugly" replied Gaya. "How could you!" I protested. "It is nothing but amusing" she replied; "Don't worry. It is so absurd, it cannot be considered an insult. You cannot insult something **beautiful** by saying it is ugly. You can only insult by saying something that **could** be true". "This dog **cannot** be considered ugly?" I wondered. "Not in the language this man speaks" she answered. This reminded me: "I didn't know you spoke Dutch!" "Not a lot" she replied; "But don't forget I've been spending my springs here for decades. It rubs off on you. And it is not a difficult language, if you speak German". "And you do, naturally..." "Ja" she replied with a smile.

When we turned left, to return to the center of the village, we saw a shiny convertible *Porsche* parking on the curb. The tourist it must have belonged to was sunbathing, while enjoying the landscape. A few meters away, a local old man in raggy clothes was stretched in a similar position. I giggled to myself: "Like the story with the Mexican beach bum". "What story is that?" Gaya inquired. "Ah, forget it. You probably know some version of it, and it is really not that funny". Gaya insisted: "Come on, tell me". I told it as telegraphically as I could: "An American millionaire is sunbathing on the beach in Acapulco, next to a local beach bum. He says to him: 'Why don't you go get a job?' 'What for?' asks the bum. 'To make money!' 'What for?' 'To build yourself a business, and make more money'. 'What for?' 'So you can become rich, like me'. 'What for?' 'To enjoy life, go on vacations, lie in the sun...' 'And what am I doing right now?' asked the Mexican". Gaya laughed much louder than the story deserved. "What's so funny?' I inquired. "You people have this story upside down!" She proclaimed; "You must think the Mexican bum to have taught the American millionaire a lesson, right?" "What else?" I wondered. "He was a stupid Mexican" she explained. "The millionaire had a much better point then the Mexican, although he was a poor **speaker**. **His** way of achieving the stretched out position in the sun is so much better than that of the Mexican! For him, lying in the sun **meant something**. It was an achievement, a **prize** for his hard work, his persistence. The Mexican was just lying there - to him, it meant next to nothing. The Mexican could not even understand what the American meant, because he didn't take his lying in the sun as a **big deal**. Would **you** rather be the Mexican?"

I am back in my room now. I developed a nice routine, a *rythmus*: Breakfast. Walk with Gaya. Then five pages above the line. Then lunch in my regular place. Then some reading, to get the philosophical juices flowing, and then five pages (or, more precisely,

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Necessary truths are always conditional, and supply no **information**. Understanding a proposition depends on its "contingency", (in the sense of "not necessary"); on the proposition's being interpretable as **either** true **or** false. this "freedom" the "contingent" proposition P "enjoys", provides its meaning: By accepting P as true, as a belief, (even temporarily), the meaningfulness of its negation is denied, and the meaning of P itself determined by its truth.

ten half-pages) of footnotes. I seem to have made some progress in the last few days: A discussion of **truth**, mostly *Davidson*. It is now again time to dive below.[44]

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[44]   So far, I have only **hinted** at the role of **morals**, or **values**, in determination of truth and meaning. Davidson, Rorty[82] and also Putnam[83], all emphasize, to one degree or another, this connection, a position broadly labeled "Pragmatism". I have tried to keep the logical discussion thus far relatively free from ethical considerations, but the time has come to bring them into the picture. I haven't yet made use of the fact that our radical translators, S1 and S2 (or, rather, radical **interpreters**, in Davidsonian jargon) have **desires**.

A speaker is not just a **belief** system. He is a **belief/desire** system. It **must** have at least one desire: To **speak**... He can (at least) choose between speaking and not speaking. If he chooses to speak, this means he considers speaking to be **better** than **not** speaking. Desires may be presented as propositions, starting with the words "I want" or "I wish" or "I prefer". A desire may be "fulfilled". Such fulfillment is simply an **abandoning** of the (fulfilled) desire: The belief "I want to eat" is **abandoned** once I have eaten.

Another way of saying the same thing, is to say that every speaker has a concept of "good", or "the preferred". This concept is a **property** (as is every concept), hereafter referred to as G. When I believe that a property A is a **good** property, I am holding the belief A⊃G. When I believe that B is bad, I hold B⊃~G. So far so good. The problems start when we try to determine whether G is an **object** or a **predicate**. On one hand, it is definitely a predicate: It does not **exist**. On the other hand, doesn't it? The definition of "existence" employed here is "being a member of the objective subdomain". Does not **every** (speaker's) subdomain include this notion? It is not the case with the predicate "red" (at least not for blind people), nor with any other predicate. But **good?!** I started this footnote with the announcement that being a **speaker** entails having a notion of preference, desire. Everybody has one. So it must be an object! A mystery.

Well, not quite. Western civilization made its choice: G is a predicate. The **good** is widely accepted as relative, as fluid, as vague. Over two thousand years of failed attempts to define the **good** had resulted in granting it the inferior ontological status of a predicate - of non-existent - not **in the world** - only in the (particular, subjective) mind. Still, everybody has one. In what follows, I shall argue for an "ontological upgrade" to the concept of **good**; from a predicate to an **object**. Furthermore, I shall claim that it should receive a status that is   **preferred** to other objects; A preferred status similar to that of   F (the contradiction), with which it all began. Every speaker has (an) **F**. Aristotle (with the help of Frege) added **x**. But beside F, and before x is (was) created by a community of speakers, there was already **G**.

The constitution of the objective subdomain was achieved by **sacrificing** (the objectivity of) **G**. A property may exist (be an object), **despite** the fact it was undesirable! Speakers may no longer (as was the case before they were thrown out of *Eden*) simply **deny** the undesirable. They are now **forced** by the community of speakers, for the sake of preservation of their creation (the objective) to accept the **bad** into their worlds. The few who tried to reject it, were declared insane (for denying the existence of "evidently" existent objects, or for affirming the existence of non-existent properties, namely, having delusions). The ones that managed to reconcile the objective world with their preferences, were **happy**. Others left society, or were committed, or simply ended up **un**happy.